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Division C of  P.L. 109-148 (2005) limits liability with respect to pandemic flu and
other public health countermeasures.  Specifically, upon a declaration by the Secretary
of Health and Human Services of a public health emergency or the credible risk of such
emergency, Division C would, with respect to a “covered countermeasure,” eliminate
liability, with one exception, for the United States, and for manufacturers, distributors,
program planners, persons who prescribe, administer or dispense the countermeasure,
and employees of any of the above.  The exception is that a defendant who engaged in
willful misconduct would be subject to liability under a new federal cause of action,
though not under state tort law.  Division C’s limitation on liability is a more severe
restriction on victims’ ability to recover than exists in most federal tort reform statutes.
However, victims could, in lieu of suing, accept payment under a new “Covered
Countermeasure Process Fund,” if Congress appropriates money for this fund.
Immunity from Liability
This report analyzes Division C of the Department of Defense Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations, P.L. 109-148, which was signed into law on December 30,
2005, and which limits liability with respect to pandemic flu and other public health
countermeasures.  Division C, which is titled the “Public Readiness and Emergency
Preparedness Act,” created § 319F-3 of the Public Health Service Act, which provides
that, except in one circumstance (discussed below under “New Federal Cause of Action”),
a “covered person” would be immune from suit and liability for “all claims for loss
caused by, arising out of, relating to, or resulting from the administration to or the use by
an individual of a covered countermeasure if a declaration ... has been issued with respect
to such countermeasure.”  The declaration referred to is a declaration by the Secretary of
Health and Human Services of a public health emergency or the credible risk of such
emergency.
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1 Section 319F-2 was enacted by the Project Bioshield Act of 2004, P.L. 108-276, § 3, and is
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6b.
2 This is a summary of a more complex definition.
Division C defines a “covered person” to include the United States and a (i)
manufacturer, (ii) distributor, (iii) program planner, (iv) qualified person who prescribed,
administered, or dispensed a covered countermeasure, or (v) official, agent, or employee
of (i) through (iv).  Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, officials, agents, and employees
of the United States are already immune from tort liability.  28 U.S.C. §§ 2679(b)(1),
2671.
Immunity is granted “to any claim for loss that has a causal relationship with the
administration to or use by an individual of a covered countermeasure, including a causal
relationship with the design, development, clinical testing or investigation, manufacture,
labeling, distribution, formulation, packaging, marketing, promotion, sale, purchase,
donation, dispensing, prescribing, administration, or use of such countermeasure.”
A “covered countermeasure” includes (A) “a qualified pandemic or epidemic
product,” (B) “a security countermeasure,” or (C)  a drug, biological product, or device
that is authorized for emergency use in accordance with section 564 of the Federal, Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act.  Each of the terms in (A), (B), and (C) is itself defined in
Division C as follows.
(A) “Qualified pandemic or epidemic product” is defined as a drug, biological
product. or device, as these three terms are defined in the Federal, Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, with the additional limitation that all three terms apply only to “a product
manufactured, used, designed, developed, modified, licensed, or procured ... to diagnose,
mitigate, prevent, treat, or cure a pandemic or epidemic,” or “a serious or life-threatening
disease or condition caused by [such] a product” — but only if such a product meets one
of three other qualifications under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. 
(B) “Security countermeasure” is defined in Division C as it is defined in § 319F-
2(c)(1)(B) of the Public Health Service Act,1 as a drug, biological product, or device (as
those terms are defined in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act) that the Secretary
of Health and Human Services approves as necessary to diagnose, mitigate, prevent, or
treat harm from any biological, chemical, radiological, or nuclear agent.2
(C) “Drug,” “biological product,” and “device” are all defined by the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act.
New Federal Cause of Action
The single circumstance in which Division C allows a covered person to be held
liable is when a “death or serious physical injury” was caused by the “willful misconduct”
of a covered person.  Division C defines “willful misconduct” as an act or omission that
is taken “(i) intentionally to achieve a wrongful purpose; (ii) knowingly without legal or
factual justification; and (iii) in disregard of a known or obvious risk that is so great as
to make it highly probable that the harm will outweigh the benefit.”  In addition, the
Secretary of HHS, in consultation with the Attorney General, “shall promulgate
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3 Strictly speaking, § 2679(b)(1)(B) does not authorize actions against federal employees, but
provides that § 2679(b)(1)(A), which gives federal employees immunity from suits under state
tort law, shall not apply to actions brought under federal statutes.  It is such federal statutes, not
§ 2679(b)(1)(B), that authorize actions against federal employees. 
4 The reason that Division C created a federal cause of action and has federal courts apply state
law, rather than simply requiring state causes of action to be brought in federal court, may be that
it might have been unconstitutional to allow state causes of action between plaintiffs and
defendants from the same state to be brought in federal court.  See, In re TMI Litigation Cases
Consol. II, 940 F.2d 832, 848-851 (3d Cir. 1991).
regulations ... that further restrict the scope of actions or omissions by a covered person
that may qualify as ‘willful misconduct.’”  Furthermore, “the plaintiff shall have the
burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence willful misconduct by each covered
person sued and that such willful misconduct caused the death or serious physical injury.”
The “clear and convincing” standard is higher than the usual burden of proof in civil
cases, which is proof by a “preponderance of the evidence.”  Finally, if an act or omission
by a manufacturer or distributor is subject to regulation by Division C or by the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, then such act or omission shall not constitute willful
misconduct if neither the Secretary of HHS nor the Attorney General has initiated an
enforcement action with respect to the act or omission, or if such an enforcement action
has been initiated and the enforcement action has been terminated or finally resolved
without a specified penalty imposed on the covered person.
The proceeding in which an injured party may seek to prove that a covered person
had engaged in willful misconduct is a new federal cause of action that Division C
created; suits under state tort law are prohibited.  Subsection (d) of the new § 319F-3
provides:  “For purposes of section 2679(b)(2)(B) of title 28, United States Code, such
a cause of action is not an action brought for violation of a statute of the United States
under which an action against a person is otherwise authorized.”  This apparently means
that the new federal cause of action may not be brought against a federal employee.3
Division C provides that suits under the new federal cause of action may be brought
only in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, and that such court, with
exceptions noted below, shall apply the substantive law, including choice of law
principles, of the state in which the alleged willful misconduct occurred.  The reference
to “choice of law principles” means that the court will apply the law of the state in which
the alleged willful misconduct occurred, but, if that state’s law provides that a different
state’s law should apply, then the court will apply the other state’s law.4
Although federal district court cases are usually heard by a single judge, cases under
Division C’s new federal cause of action will be “assigned initially to a panel of three
judges.  Such panel shall have jurisdiction over such action for purposes of considering
motions to dismiss, motions for summary judgment, and matters related thereto.  If such
panel has denied such motions, or if the time for filing such motions has expired, such
panel shall refer the action to the chief judge for assignment for further proceedings,
including any trial.”  This suggests that the panel’s jurisdiction is limited to pretrial
motions, and that a single judge will run the trial, including ruling on motions to dismiss
and motions for summary judgment that were made after the trial began.
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5 The reference to subsection (a) seems unclear because subsection (a) provides for the
establishment of the fund, not for its funding.
6 Thus, the Covered Countermeasure Process Fund will not provide compensation unless
Congress enacts a separate statute that appropriates money for it.
7 Sections 264, 265, and 266 were enacted by the Smallpox Protection Act, P.L. 108-20 (2003),
and are codified, respectively, at 42 U.S.C. § 239c, 239d, and 239e.
Under the new federal cause of action, certain matters are not governed by state law.
Damage awards will be reduced by the amount of collateral source benefits, with
“collateral source benefits” defined to include amounts the plaintiff is entitled to receive
from any governmental program, workers’ compensation law, health or disability
insurance, and the like.  Collateral sources will have no right of subrogation, which means
that they could not recover, out of the damages the plaintiff recovers in a lawsuit brought
under the new federal cause of action, benefits that they had paid the plaintiff.
Under the new federal cause of action, noneconomic damages, which are damages
for pain and suffering and other non-monetary losses, “may be awarded only in an amount
directly proportional to the percentage of responsibility of a defendant for harm to the
plaintiff.”  This means that, if two defendants are found liable for willful misconduct, then
they will not be jointly and severally liable for noneconomic damages, which means that
they will not each be liable for the full amount of the plaintiff’s noneconomic damages.
If, for example, one of the two defendants was 25% responsible for the harm and the other
was 75% responsible for the harm, then the plaintiff may recover no more than 25% of
his noneconomic damages from the first, even if the second is insolvent.  With respect to
economic damages, however, the plaintiff may recover up to 100% from either liable
party, if the relevant state law provides for joint and several liability.
Under the new federal cause of action, Rule 11 sanctions against attorneys, law
firms, or parties, for filing frivolous claims or defenses or filing papers for improper
purposes, are mandatory.  Rule 11 currently makes sanctions discretionary on the part of
the court.
Covered Countermeasure Process Fund
Division C also created a new section 319F-4 of the Public Health Service Act
which, upon issuance by the Secretary of the declaration referred to in the first paragraph
of this report, would establish in the Treasury the “Covered Countermeasure Process
Fund.”  “[T]he Secretary shall, after amounts have by law been provided for the Fund
under subsection (a)5 provide compensation to an eligible individual for a covered injury
[i.e., serious physical injury or death] directly caused by the administration or use of a
covered countermeasure pursuant to such declaration.”6  Despite the “shall” quoted in the
previous sentence, an eligible “individual has an election to accept the compensation or
to bring an action under” the new federal cause of action, but may not do both.
Compensation under this fund would be in the same amount as is prescribed by sections
264, 265, and 266 of the Public Service Health Act for persons injured as a result of the
administration of certain countermeasures against smallpox.7  These three sections
provide, respectively, medical benefits, compensation for lost employment income, and
death benefits, but do not provide damages for pain and suffering.
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8 CRS Report 95-797 includes citations to all statutes mentioned in this section of the present
report.
9 These statutes make private parties immune from suit by declaring them federal employees for
liability purposes, as the Federal Tort Claims Act makes federal employees immune from liability
for torts they commit in the course of employment.  For additional information, see CRS Report
97-579, Making Private Entities and Individuals Immune From Tort Liability by Declaring Them
Federal Employees, by Henry Cohen.
10 The Project BioShield Act of 2004, P.L. 108-276, which enacted § 319F-1(d)(2) of the Public
Service Health Act, 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6a(d)(2), provides that a person carrying out a personal
service contract under the statute, “and an officer, employee, or governing board member of such
person shall, subject to a determination by the Secretary, be deemed to be an employee of the
Department of Health and Human Services for purposes of [the FTCA].”  The section, however,
contains exceptions to the immunity from liability that the FTCA otherwise grants to federal
employees:  “Should payment be made by the United States to any claimant ..., the United States
shall have ... the right to recover against [the person deemed a federal employee] for that portion
of the damages so awarded or paid, as well as interest and any costs of litigation, resulting from
(continued...)
Comparison with Existing Federal Tort Reform Statutes
Congress has enacted other tort reform statutes to limit liability under state law, and
these statutes are briefly summarized in the appendix to CRS Report 95-797, Federal Tort
Reform Legislation: Constitutionality and Summaries of Selected Statutes, by Henry
Cohen.8  The rest of this report will describe the broad categories into which these statutes
may be placed, so that Division C can be compared with them.
Some federal statutes eliminate liability and do not provide for an alternate means
of recovery by victims.  The General Aviation Revitalization Act, enacted in 1994, for
example, bars, without exception, products liability suits against manufacturers of small
planes more than 18 years old.  The Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, enacted
in October 2005, bars, with exceptions, suits against manufacturers and sellers of firearms
or ammunition, and trade associations, for damages resulting from the criminal or
unlawful misuse of a firearm or ammunition.  The exceptions in the Protection of Lawful
Commerce in Arms Act, include, but are not limited to, violations of law.
With some statutes, Congress has eliminated the right to sue for ordinary negligence,
but not eliminated it for gross negligence or for intentional or willful misconduct.
Examples include the Bill Emerson Good Samaritan Food Donation Act, the Volunteer
Protection Act, the Aviation Medical Assistance Act of 1998, the Cardiac Arrest Survival
Act of 2000, and the Paul D. Coverdell Teacher Protection Act of 2001.  Division C, by
eliminating liability for gross negligence and retaining it only for willful misconduct,
would go further in preempting state law than the statutes cited in this paragraph do.
Division C, however, would also allow injured persons to elect to accept compensation
from the Covered Countermeasure Process Fund, if Congress appropriates money for it.
More than fifty federal statutes provide total immunity to particular private parties,
but make the U.S. government liable, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, in their stead.9
An example of such a statute is section 304 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, which
immunizes from liability manufacturers and administrators of smallpox vaccine.10  There
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10 (...continued)
the failure ... to carry out any obligation or responsibility ... under a contract with the United
States or from any grossly negligent or reckless conduct or intentional or willful misconduct....”
11 Federal employees, civilian or military, may not sue under the FTCA, but may receive federal
benefits if injured on the job.  Plaintiffs who may sue under the FTCA nevertheless may not
recover, and be left without a remedy, if one of the FTCA’s exceptions applies.  These include
the discretionary function exception and the exception for claims arising in a foreign country.
For additional information, see CRS Report 95-717, Federal Tort Claims Act: Current
Legislative and Judicial Issues, by Henry Cohen.
12 For additional information on the SAFETY Act, see CRS Report RL31649, Homeland Security
Act of 2002: Tort Liability Provisions, by Henry Cohen.
are situations, however, in which the U.S. government may not be held liable under the
FTCA, and, in those situations, victims may be left without a remedy.11  Even when the
United States may be held liable under the FTCA, it may never be held liable for punitive
damages, even in states that authorize punitive damages awards.
Occasionally Congress immunizes private parties but establishes a federal
compensation program.  Examples include the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act,
which immunizes government contractors who carried out atomic weapons testing
programs from 1946 to 1962, as well as the National Childhood Vaccine Injury
Compensation Act of 1986 and the September 11th Victims Compensation Fund of 2001.
These three programs differ in various ways.  Only the radiation law precludes lawsuits.
The vaccine law requires that victims first apply for no-fault, limited compensation under
the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (which is funded by a manufacturers’
excise tax on certain vaccines).  Claimants, however, may reject what they are offered
under the program and sue under state law, though with some limitations on their rights
under state law.  The September 11th fund did not limit the right to sue unless one chose
to file for compensation under the fund, but, with respect to lawsuits, it capped airlines’
liability at the limits of their liability insurance coverage. 
Finally, some federal tort reform statutes do not eliminate the right to sue and do not
establish alternative compensation mechanisms.  Rather, they cap noneconomic and
punitive damages, limit each defendant’s share of the total liability to its share of
responsibility for the plaintiff’s injuries, or take other steps to limit recovery.  Examples
include the Y2K Act, which limited liability for Y2K failures, and the SAFETY Act,
which limits the liability of sellers of anti-terrorism technologies.  The SAFETY Act, like
Division C, substitutes a federal cause of action for state causes of action, but continues
to apply state law.12  Capping damages and otherwise limiting liability while retaining the
right to sue is also the approach taken by pending medical malpractice legislation, such
as H.R. 5, 109th Congress, which the House passed on July 28, 2005.
